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Tests for Liquidity Constraints:
A Critical Survey
1½BSTRAC
Thispaper surveys recent empirical work on tests for
liquidity constraints.The focus of the survey is on the
tests based on the Euler equation.After examining the
technical aspects of the recent testson aggregate time-
series data and on micro data, thesurvey tries to evaluate
their economic significance. Thepaper concludes that for
a significant fraction of the population thebehavior of
consumption over time is affected in away predicted by
credit rationing and differentialborrowing and lending
rates.However, the available evidence is shown tohave
failed in providing informationnecessary to calculate the
response of consumption to changes in the timeprofile of income.The paper attributes the failure to thefact that
not much attention in the literature hasbeen paid to the




Evanston, IL 602011. Introduction
The issue of liquidity constraints comes up in severalareas of
economics. The main ingredient in modern theories of business cycles is the
consumerswhoexecute intertemporal optimization through trading in
perfectlycompetitive asset markets.Traditionally, the Life Cycle-
Permanent Income Hypothesis has been the label of suchconsumer behavior.
Some authors have argued that the observed comovements ofconsumption and
income (or the lack thereof) can best be explained byexamining the role of
liquidity constraints as the additional constraint in theconsumers'
decision problem.'The notion that consumers are unable to borrow as they
desire is also used to argue against the Ricardian doctrineof the
equivalence of taxes and deficits. In the literature on implicit labor
contracts, the assumption is often made that workers are unable to borrow
against future earnings. Liquidity constraints haveeven been used in some
instances as an excuse to focus on static single-period analyses.
Despite its popularity, the term liquidity constraints has notYet
gained a precise and unique definition.To some the term might be
associated with agents facing the cash-in-advance constraint. Themost
widely accepted definition, however, is that consumersare said to be
liquidity constrained if they face quantity constraintson the amount of
borrowing (credit rationing) or if the loan rates available to themare
higher than the rate at which they could lend (differential rates).In this
survey we will employ this definition of liquidity constraints, thereby
abstracting from the interesting and important issue of whypeople hold
money.The survey is selective in other ways too. We will ignore the possible
connectionbetween consumption andincome arising from the consumption-
leisure choice. This is justified if consumption and leisure areseparable
in the utility function.We will also ignore the large literature on
econometricstudies of the consumption function. Our focus therefore is on
whathas come to be called the Euler qjon pprQch which has been the
rapidly growing segment of the literature on consumer behavior. Our choice
of being selective is motivated by the recent exhaustive survey ably done by
Mervyn King (1983).
The questions we would hope to be answered by the available empirical
evidence may be divided into three groups. First of all, we would like to
know if the Life Cycle-Permanent Income Hypothesis can be rejected in favor
of the hypothesis of liquidity constraints.Although there exist many
studies rejecting the hypothesis, another careful scrutiny may be warranted.
Second,if liquidity constraints are shown to exist, how do we proceed to
identifythe preference parameters under liquidity constraints?The
identification of the structural parameters is a necessary prelude to the
construction of macro models that would allow us to study business cycles
and analyze policy interventions. Third, which of the standard conclusions
derived under no liquidity constraints will survive and which will not?
More specifically, under liquidity constraints how does consumption respond
to temporary income changes? Does the Ricardiani Equivalence Theorem cease
to hold? The available empirical work will he examined critically on these
three scores.
The organization of the paper is as follows. Section 2 outlines the
test for liquidity constraints based on the Euler equation and contrasts it
with the approach based on the consumption function. Problems associated
with the Euler equation approach are also discussed. Section 3 examines the3
available empirical evidence from aggregate data and micro data. The
discussion of technical issues is contained in this section. In section 4,
which contains original material, we will consider three specific models of
liquidity constraints and argue that the economic implication of the
available evidence cannot be determined unless the cause of liquidity
constraints is identified. Section 5 is a brief conclusion.4
2. Intertemporal Optimization with and without Liquidity Constraints
Throughout this section and section 4, we will focus for expositional
ease on the conventional two-period model of intertemporal optimization,
although most of the discussion can be readily extended to the many-period
case. The objective function of the consumer is the expectation of lifetime
utility that is time separable:
(2.1) u(c1) +E1u(c2),
where cjis consumption in period t (t=1,2), u(.) is the instantaneous
utility function, is the discount factor, E1 is the expectations operator
conditional on information available to the consumer in period 1. Let Aj
and Wtbenonhuman wealth and after-tax labor income in period t. Then At
follows:
(2.2) A2 =(1+r)(A1+w1—
wherer is the market risk-free real rate. The constraint to the consumer
is that debt be eventually paid back, which means under no bequests that,
for any realization of (possibly stochastic) future labor income w2,
(2.3) c2 =A2+w2.
Combining (2.2) and (2.3) we obtain the lifetime budget constraint:
(2.4) c1 +c2/(l+r)=A1+w1+w2/(1+r).5
The important observation to be made here is that the consumer is
constrained only by the lifetime budget constraint, so that consumption can
be shielded from period-to-period fluctuations in income through borrowing
and lending. Any changes in the configuration of (w1,w2) lead to revisions
in the optimal consumption plan (ci* ,c2*) only in so far as they change the
distribution of w1+w2/(1+r), Thus the MPC (marginal propensity to consume)
out of a temporary increase in w1 (which leaves unaltered the distribution
of w2) will be much smaller than the MPC out of a permanent increase in w1
(which shifts the distribution of w2 by the amount of increase in w1).2
However, as recent research to be surveyed in the next section
indicates, consumption appears to be more sensitive to current income than
is implied by intertemporal optimization. One explanation that has often
been mentioned is the existence of liquidity constraints or imperfect loan
markets. It means either that consumers are credit rationed (so that there
is a lower bound on nonhuman wealth) or that the loan rates available to
consumers are higher than the lending rate (the market interest rate). The
consequence of liquidity constraints can be seen most easily for the
deterministic case in which the consumer has a point expectation 2e about
future labor income w2. Figure 1(a) is the familiar diagram showing that
theoptimal consumption plan (ci* ,c2*) in the absence of liquidity
constraints is thepoint where the marginal rate of substitution
u'(c1)/[u(c2)] is equated to the marginal rate of transformation 1+r. As
long as totai wealth (the sum of nonhuman wealth A1 and human wealth
e e w1+w2/(l+r))s held constant, changes in the configuration of (w1 ,w2
have no influence whatsoever on current consumption. Panels (b) and (c) of
Figure 1illustrate the two versions of liquidity constraints: in Figure
1(b) the consumer is credit rationed with the amount. ofrationing being6
ci*_Aj_wi, while in Figure 1(c) the consumer faces a schedule of loanrates
as an increasing function of the loan quantity,tinder liquidity constraints
consumption is excessively sensitive to income in the following sense.If
the consumer is credit rationed and if the amount of rationing is constant,
the optimal consumption plan moves from point A to B in Figure 1(b) as
current income increases from w1 to w1 .Sothe MPC out of a temporary
current income increase is unity.It is less than but still close to unity
when the consumer faces an upward sloping borrowing rate schedule.It is
also clear that under liquidity constraints current consumption is not
invariant to changes in the configuration of (WL,W2e) that hold total wealth
constant.
Followingthe lead of Hall (1978), recent tests for liquidity
constraints have utilized the "Euler equations' (first-order conditions
characterizing the optimal consumption plan) rather than the consumption
function (optimal contingency rule that relates optimal current consumption
to the set of information currently available to the consumer). As seen
above, the implication of the lifetime budget constraint is that consumption
is invariant to changes in income if total wealth is controlled for. The
test for liquidity constraints based on the consumption function exploits
this by regressing consumption on total wealth and current income and by
the significance of the income coefficient. There are several
reasons against this consumption function approach.We mention two of
them.3First, when future income is uncertain, a closed-form optimal
contingency rule cannot in general be derived, which renders the notion of
"total wealth" unoperational. Even if a closed-form solution is available,
the definition of total wealth is not preference-free. For instance, if the
instantaneous utility function is quadratic, the consumption function is(2.5) c1 =a0+ajx(A1+w1+E(w2)/(1+r)},
where a0 arid a1 depend on r and the parameters characterlizing the
instantaneous utility function.If the instantaneous utility function
exhibits a constant absolute risk aversion, the consumption function is
(2.6) c1 =b0+b1x{A1+w1+[n(Ei(exp(_iiw2))]
(1+r)
where J.1isthe constant degree of absolute risk aversion. The definition of
total wealth, which is the expression in the braces, depends on the utility
function.This example also highlights the second difficulty with the
consumption function approach: total wealth (if it is well-defined) cannot
be calculated without data on the distribution of future income. Such data
are not typically available.
TheEulerequationapproachexploitsanother implication of
intertemporal optimization subject to the lifetime budget constraint, namely
that at optimum the marginal rate of substitution between current and future
consumption is set equal to the marginal rate of transformation (see Figure
1(a)).The beauty of this approach is that it can easily accomodate
stochastic real rates as well as stochastic labor income:
(2.7a) u'(c1) =E1[(1+r)u'(c2)],or
(2.7b) Ej[(1+r)u'(c2)/u'(c1)] =1,or
(2.7c) E1(e2) =0where e2 =1—(1+r)u'(c2;e)/u'(c1;o),8
where e is a parameter vector characterizing the utility function. The
interpretation of the Euler equation is familiar: the left hand side of
(2.7a)is the marginal utility benefit of increasing c1 by one unit, while
the right hand side is the marginal utility cost of a reduction in c2
arising from the reduced current saving. Equation (2.7b) indicates that, ex
ante, the marginal rate of substitution and the marginal rate of transforma-
tion are equated. Ex post, the two rates can differ because the realization
of future income and real rates are not perfectly foreseen. The discrepancy
is represented by the consumption innovation e2.The most attractive
feature of the Euler equation approach is that it allows a direct estimation
of preference parameters (e,) as done by Hansen and Singleton (1982). If
x1is a vector of variables in the period 1 information set, (2.7c) implies
that the conditional expectation E(e21x1) is zero, which in turn means
E(e2x1) =0.Under rational expectations, the consumer's subjective
distribution about future stochastic variables agrees with the objective
distribution, so that the orthogonality condition E(e2x1) =0(and hence
Cov(e2,x1) =0)musth!don data. This is precisely the situation for
which Hansen's (1982) GMM (generalized methods of moments) estimation is
designedtoestimatetheunknown preference parameters under the
orthogonal ity condition.
The Euler equation does not hold in the presence of liquidity
constraints, because consumers who would like to borrow at the market rate
but who are prevented from doing so consume relatively less in period 1 and
more in period 2 than in the absence of liquidity constraints. Thus under
liquidity constraints there should be a negative correlation between the
marginal rate of substitution and A1+w1 or any variable that reduces the
severity of liquidity constraints (see Figure 1(b) and (c)). This is the9
basic strategy of testing for liquidity constraints by the Euler equation.
In its most sophisticated form, the procedure is Hansen's (1982) test of
overidentifying restrictions: estimate the preference parameters (e,) from
the nonlinear Euler equation (2.7c) by the GMM where the set of instruments
x1 in the period 1information set excludes variables (like A1 and w1)
pertinent to the consumer's liquidity, estimate by the GMM where x1 is
expanded to include liquidity variables and compare the two estimates. If
they significantly differ, liquidity constraints must be binding. This test
takes a familiar form for some commonly used utility functions, because the
Euler equation can be made linear. In the case of quadratic utility Iu(c) =
-(cr--c)2Jwith a deterministic interest rate r, the Euler equation is
(2.8) c2[l—(1+rYIcz +'(1+rY'c1+E2, 2 = c2—E1(c2).
In the case of a constant absolute risk aversion [u(c)-exp(-ic), i>0],
it is
(2.9) c2 -c1=inU)+f'Qn(1+r)+
wheree2 is defined in (2.7cL4 In the case of a constant relative risk
aversion [u(c) =c'1",o > 01, it is
(2.10) n(c2) -n(c1)=on()+an(1+r)+oe2.
This a- is called the elasticity of intertemporal substitution. We can test
for liquidity constraints by adding a set of variables in the period 1
information set that represent the consumer's liquidity to the EulerID
equation.Since the consumption innovation e2 and E2isuncorrelated with
any variable in the period 1 information set, the regression estimate of the
liquidity variable coefficients should be insignificant if the consumer is
not liquidity constrained.5
Before turning to a survey of recent empirical work, we point out three
nontechnical problems with the Euler equation approach; technical problems
will be discussed in the next section. The last two are also shared by the
consumption function approach.The first problem, which is completely
obscured by our focus on the two-period model, is that the Euler equation
does not exhaust all the implication of intertemporal optimization subject
only to the lifetime budget constraint. Although it captures the important
implication that under rational expectations the change in the marqinaI
utility of consumption (the consumption innovation) is uncorrelated with any
variable (like anticipated income changes, permanent or temporary) in the
period 1information set, the Euler equation does not by itself place any
restrictionson the relation between the consumption innovation and
unanticipated income changes. The Euler equation will be satisfied even ii
the consumer is myopic in that he or she cares only about the first two
periods of the multi-period life.Even though the consumer's planning
horizonis the entire lifetime, the likelihood of future liquidity
constraints effectively shortens the horizon.6 For example, if the consumer
expects that he or she will face a binding constraint of a ban on borrowing
n periods from now, the optimal consumption plan will be such that nonhuman
wealth in that period is zero. So the consumer will act as if the horizon
is only n periods.From the Euler equation alone we cannot tell how the
consumer would react to a unanticipated temporary income change. This
problem can be alleviated by the use of the Euler equation between c1 and11
cj: u'(c1) ='E1[(1+r)u'(c1+flwhere rn is the n-period real rate.If
the Euler equation is satisfied for all n, 1n1, then the effective
horizon is longer than T periods. However, the horizon length to be tested
is limited if the data are a short panel. Another solution is to make an
auxiliary assumption about the stochastic process generating labor income
and derive a theoretical relationship involving the horizon length between
the consumption innovation e2 and innovations in labor income.7 This forms
the basis of what we will call the excess sensitivity test.
Second, the derivation of the Euler equation and the consumption
function has ignored the nonnegativity constraint ct0. This is justified
if disutility of zero consumption is prohibitive (i.e., u(0) =+w) andif
the consumer has to go through zero consumption in the event of default. No
plan allowing defaults can be chosen. Otherwise, the consumer may plan to
default when the second period labor income turns out to be insufficient to
repay the loan, which will either put a premium in the loan rate or limit
the quantity of the loan available to the consumer. For example, if the
loan market can provide only risk-free loans, the constraint that c2 =A2+
0 (see (2.3)) for any realization of the stochastic variable w2 implies
that the loan repayment (-A2) must be less than or equal to the sure part of
w2. This certainly blurs the distinction between intertemporal optimization
with and without liquidity constraints.This important issue will he
discussed later at some length in a separate section (section 4).
The third problem is closely related to the second. In the test for
liquidity constraints described above, no intertemporal optimization problem
under liquidity constraints is explicitly spelled out.One possible
specification is to assume that the loan rate available to the consumer is
an increasing function of the loan quantity c1-A1-w1, which delivers an12
Euler equation under liquidity constraints that the xantemarginal rate of
substitution equals one plus the loan rate on marginal loans. Since the
marginal loan rate is a function of the loan quantity under liquidity
constraints, we can test for liquidity constraints by examining the
relationship between the marginal rate of substitution and the loan
quantity.This is essentially the test for liquidity constraints discussed
above.One could further proceed to estimate under this specification of
liquidity constraints both preference parameters and the loan rate schedule
using this Euler equation.But it leaves unanswered the question of qy
there exists a gap between the loan rate and the risk—free rate. If the gap
is a premium that compensates for possible defaults, the rate of return on a
loan is no longer exogenous to the consumer in that its realization depends
on the loan quantity: it equals the contracted loan rate if the consumer
repays the loan in full and minus one if the consumer defaults on the loan.
Then the Euler equation under liquidity constraints will take a different
form because the level of the second period consumption in the event of
default is unaffected by marginal changes in the loan quantity. Thus, the
estimate of preference parameters under liquidity constraints is sensitive
to the nature of the loan market underlying the loan rate schedule. An
example in which this is the case will be provided in section 4.13
3. Recent Empirical Work
A. Tests for Liquidity Constraints using Aggregate Time-Series Data
Two types of tests can be distinguished in the literature. The first
test, which may be called the orthogonality test, checks whether the
consumption innovation ej (defined in (2.7) for t =2)is orthogonal to any
variables in the information set available to the consumer in period
t-l.Recent studies (see e.g., Dunn-Singleton (1984)) have extended the
Hansen-Singleton (1982) paper by including durables or by examining several
asset returns simultaneously. Typically, the overidentifying restrictions
are strongly rejected.8 This, however, cannot be taken as evidence in favor
of liquidity constraints, because, the estimation of preference parameters
being their primary concern, these studies did not specifically include
liquidity variables in the set of additional variables used for the test of
overidentifyingrestrictions. Mosttime-series tests for liquidity
constraints assume constant real rates.9
The second test may be called the excess Jjjyfly test. Since under
constant real rates labor income is the only source of uncertainly, the
consumption innovation must be proportional to the labor income innovation.
Now make the auxiliary assumption that labor income follows a univariate
autoregress 1 ye process:
(3.1) Wj p+P1Wj..1+P2W...2+. . . + Pj..nWt_n+Uj, E—1(u) 0.
Then, as shown by Flavin (1981) for the case of quadratic utility with
(l+r) 1, we obtain the following relation between the consumption and
labor income innovations when the horizon length is infinite: cj =ku
where k =(r/(1+r))[i—Pi(1+rY—p2U+r)2-...—prl+rr].If an estimate of14
1<is greater than this expression, consumption is moresensitiveto current
labor income than is justified by interteuipora.t optimization without
liquidity constraints. The failure of the orthogonality test is sufficient
but not necessary, for the excess sensitivity tes-t to fail, because mopft
consumers whose horizon is short but longer than two periods will also
satisfy the Euler equation.
In Flavin's (1981) testing procedure, thelaggedincome coefficients in
the regression of the consumption innovation on Q_ have a certain
structural interpretation, as the following example shows. Suppose, as Hall
(1978) suggested, that there are two types of consumers. The first group
(the "rule of thumb" consumers) simply consume all of its disposable income,
either because they face a binding constraint of a ban on debt or because
they are myopic. If this group earns a fraction A of aggregate disposable
income y, the change in their consumption is A(yyt_1). Consumers in the
second group follow the Euler equation (2.8) with (1+r) =1.Namely,
consumptionby the second group is a random walk.Then aggregate
consumption is described by
(3.2) Act c -c_1AAYt + t.
-It is incorrect to estimate A in (3.2) by regressing ACjonAy because Ay,
not necessarily in can be correlated with .Toextract (part of)
the disposable income change that is forecastable on the basis of
write the least squares projection of y on lagged disposable income as
(3.3) yj ji+Pyj_1 + vj.15
By construction, Vtis uncorrelated with lagged disposable income. Since
there may be other variables in that help predict Yj,thisVt JS not
necessarily the true innovation to disposable income (i.e., Et.1(et) may not
be equal to 0). The consumption equation (3.2) can be rewritten as
(3.4) Au + A(P—1)y1_1 + (Et + AVt).
Nowtheerror term +AVtisuncorrelated with lagged disposable income.
The parameters (A,p,P) can be estimated from (3.3) and (3.4) by the
multivariate regression with the cross-equations restriction that the same
autoregression coefficient P appears in both equations. This estimate of A
is numerically identical to the estimate obtained from (3.2) by the
instrumental variables technique with yt-1 as the instrument for Ayj. The
test statistic for the hypothesis A =0is numerically identical to the t
statistic in the regression of Acj on Yt—i. Flavin's estimate of A based on
detrended quarterly U.S. data on nondurables and disposable income was so
large that almost all of aggregate consumption was attributable to the "rule
of thumb"consumers.
Onetechnicaland potentially serious problem can be pointed out at
thisjunction: the use of detrended data biases the test toward rejection of
the hypothesis that A =0,if disposable income is a random walk)0 As
noted by Hall (1978), the model consisting of (3.3) and (3.4) becomes
unidentifiable if disposable income is a random walk (so that P =1),
because the lagged income coefficient A(P-1) is zero no matter what the
value of A is. Now consider what happens when A is zero and detrended data
are used. Since the consumption innovation is proportional to the labor
income innovation, the consumption and disposable income series will be16
highly correlated random walks. Furthermore, detrended series from random
walks exhibit spurious cycles. Thus detrended consumption and disposable
incomewill move up and down together in a cyclical fashion. Mankiw-
Shapiro (1984) have shown that if such series are used to estimate (3.4),
the lagged income coefficient is likely to be significant.
Other empirical studies that assume constant real rates include Bilson
(1980), Hayashi(1982), and Flavin (1985). Bilson use data from the U.S.,
the U.K. and West Germany.Because of data limitations his consumption
concept istotalconsumptionexpenditure (which includes durables
expenditure), while Hayashi, using U.S. annual data, excludes durables
expenditure and includes service flows from durables. He estimates A, the
fraction of the "rule of thumb" consumers, by the instrumental variables
technique.Flavin (1985) finds that the change in the unemployment rate is
highly significant if it is included in the consumption equation (3.2). Her
interpretationis that the "rule of thumb" consumers are liquidity
constrained rather than myopic. Overall, the studies surveyed so far point
to rejection of the hypothesis of intertemporal optimization without
liquidity constraints.
These studies use different consumption concepts. Although inclusion
of durables expenditure in the consumption concept is unwarranted because it
is service flows from durables that yield utility, the focus on a particular
consumption category can be justified if the instantaneous utility function
is separable across commodities. That is, if U(Cj) =Ui(Cit)+ U2(C2t) +
+ Un(Cnt) (where n here is the dimension of the consumption vector Cj),
the Euler equation holds for each consumption component. The rejections
reported in the empirical studies may be attributable to nonseparability
across commodities. Bernanke (1985) studied a simultaneous determination of17
nondurables and durables purchases.The quadratic instantaneous utility
function he estimated is:
(3.5) u-(1/2)(c—c1)2 —(a/2)(K—K)2—m(c—ct)(K—Kj) —(d/2)(K+1—K)2,
where cj is nondurables (plus services) and Kj is the stock of consumer
durables.The third term captures the interaction between nondurables and
durables.Adjustment costs in changing the stock of durables are also
introduced by the fourth term.If in0, the Euler equation for nondurables
is (2.8) and does not involve Mt.Ifm =aand d =0,then nondurables and
durables are perfect substitutes, so the correct consumption concept must
include service flows from the stock of durables. Bernanke rejected the
hypothesis of interteinporal optimization without liquidity constraints
because consumption is too sensitive to labor income innovations. His
estimate of a, m and d is too imprecise to determine what the relevant
consumption concept should be. His rejection of the hypothesis, however,
may be due to his use of detrended data.
Asmentionedabove, under constant real rates the consumption
innovation should be proportional to the labor income innovation. Results
IiKotlikoff-Pakes(1984) for the U.S. and Weissenberger (1985) for the U.K.
and west Germany show that the labor income innovations estimated from
univariate time-series models explain only a very small fraction of the
consumption innovation.This suggests that changes in real rates and
"transitoy cojon (i.e., shocks to the utility function and
measurement errors in consumption) are important determinant of consumption
changes.Even if real rates are constant, simultaneity bias caused by
transitory consumption is sufficient to invalidate the orthogonality tests.Suppose, for examp1e, there is a white noise taste shock rtothe quadratic
utility function: u(c)—(a+r1t—C)2.Asshown by Flavin (1981), the Euler
equation with (1+r) =1j:
(3.6) ACj= Et+ rij/(i+r) -fl._1.
So consumption is no longer a random walk. If Thiscorrelated with Y-
throughgeneral equilibrium interactions, lagged income will be significant
in the regression of Acj on Yt-i.Even if there is no transitory
consumption, the neglect of changes in real rates may lead econometricians
to erroneously conclude that the excess sensitivity test fails. Consider,
forexample, Lucas's (1978)modelof asset prices where agents
intertemporallyoptimize without liquidity constraints.Assume that
endowments are white noise, so that all endowment changes are temporary.
Since there is no saving in equilibrium, observed consumption perfectly
tracks income!
Another reason for the random walk hypothesis to appear to fail is time
aggregation.There is no reason that the decision interval coincides with
the data sampling interval. Christiano (1984) shows using quarterly U.S.
data on nondurables plus services and disposable income that the random walk
hypothesis (in levels and in logs), while itcan be rejected if the
decision interval is taken to be the sampling interval, is consistent with
the quarterly data if the decision interval is semi-quarterly.
And then there is the question of aggregation across consumers. Unless
the utility function takes a specific form like a quadratic form, the Euler
equation does not aggregate across consuiirs. What then is it that we have
been estimating on aggregate data? As Constantinides (1984) has shown, at19
least in Arrow-Debreu economies there exists a fictitious representative
consumer who maximizes a utility function defined over the aggregate of
individualconsumptjonsgeneratedbyconsumerswith heterogeneous
preferences.But since in general that representative consumer's utility
function depends on income distribution, the preference parameters estimated
on aggregate data is not invariant to changes in policy rules that induce
redistribution of income.11
This list of caveats suggests that the time-series evidence is far from
conclusive.Furthermore, key parameters (preference parameters and the A
parameter) have not been sharply estimated.Our interest, therefore,
naturally turns to the wealth of information contained in micro data. By
using micro data, we may be able to avoid problems associated with
simultaneity, aggregation,and nonstationarity that are inherent in
aggregate time-series data. However, as we will see, micro data have their
own problems.
B. Tests using Micro Data
To implement the Euler equation approach at micro level, we need panel
data because the Euler equation involves consumption at two points in time.
A typical panel data set has information for a large number (N) of
households but the number of periods covered (T) is small. If x is the
value of x for household i at time t and if the population of households
from which the sample is drawn is represented by a uniform distribution over
the unit interval, the (population) mean of xj is I1Xj(w)dw, which can be
0
N
consistently estimated by the cross-section average N'xjj. The variance
1=1
and the covariance are defined accordingly. A very useful discussion of the
econometrics of panel data can be found in Chamher]ain (1984).20
Hali-Mishkin (1982) were the first implementation of the Euler equation
approach on panel data.They examine the relation between consumption
innovations and income innovations. The data come from the University of
Mlchigans Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) which contains information
on food consumption (including expenditure in restaurants) in an average
week of the year and income over several years.The following is a
simplified version of the model. Make the auxiliary assumption that labor
income Wt is described by
(3.7) -Wt—i=Uj+ Vt,
where u and v are serially and mutually uncorrelated shocks to labor income.
Thus u and v are permanent and temporary shocks. Under the assumption of
quadratic utility and (l÷r) 1 the change in consumption under no
liquidity constraints is directly tied to these shocks as
(3.8) ACjaUt + akvj + tt,
where is an additive measurement error in consumption and a is the
marginal expenditure share of food.12 The temporary income coefficient k
should be close to 0. Under an infinite horizon, it equals r/(1+r) (see the
expression f or k right below (3.1)). This model, however, turned out to be
inconsistent with the data because it failed the orthogonality test: the
lagged income change was negative and significant in the regression of 1Ct
on LYj....j.So the model is augmented to encompass the "rule of thumb"
consumers (whose consumption simply tracks income) as21
(3.9) Ac =(1-A)(cu+akv)+ A(au.t+aAvj) +
(3.7) and (3.9) imply that each element of the covariance matrix of the
vector (Acl,...,AcT,Awl,...,AwT) is a function of the parameters of the
model (which include ,k,A, and the variance of u,v,€). Hall-Mish].c!ri
(1982) use the maximum likelihood procedure assuming normality.The
normality assumption is unwarranted if a constant fraction A of the
population (rather than of consumption) is assumed to follow the rule of
thumb, because then Act will have a binomial element. If the distribution
is not normal, their point estimate is consistent but standard errors are
biased probably downwards (see Camberlain (1984)). They use disposable
income for w, presumably because under constant real rates there should be
no shocks to property income. Their estimates indicate that more than 90
percent of the variance in Ac is accounted for by the consumption
measurement error. Their estimate of k of 0.17 is somewhat larger than the
theoretical prediction.A is estimated to be 0.20 with a t value of about
3. Bernanke (1984) applied this methodology to data on automobile
expenditure (University of Michigan's Survey of Consumer Finances). His
estimate of A does not indicate the presence of rule of thumb expenditure.
This may be explained by the fact that automobile expenditure can easily be
f i nanced.
Probably the mostseriouscriticism of the methodology just described
isits neglect of income measurement error. Since the autocorrelation of
income changes gets garbled by (possibly serially correlated) income
measurement errors, it is difficult to model the true income process with
confidence.Also, even tinder a given specification of the income process,
t.he model becomes very difficult to identify.Asmall correlation betweenconsumption and income changes is consistent with intertemporally optimizing
consumers partially responding to mostly transitory income changes. But it
is also consistent with rule of thumb consumers weakly responding to noisy
measure of income changes. The excess sensitivity test in micro data with
income measurement error is practically impossible. The issue of income
measurement error in the PSID data is taken up by Altonji-Siow (1985) who
use the log-linear version (2.10) of the Euler equation. By allowing for a
taste shock V1inthe constant relative risk aversion utility function u(c) =
exp(rl/r)c"°and a multiplicative measurement errorin consumption, the
error term in (2.10) becomes: re2 +1fl2+A€2.Treating the real rate r as
constant across consumers, the relation of the forecast error e2 with the
current income change iny2 n(y2)-n(y1) can be estimated by regressing
9.n(c2)-n(c1) on Any2 (provided, of course, that fl andare
uncorrelated with Qny). But if y contains measurement error, we have the
classical errors-in-variables problem that the regression estimate of the
£Qny2 coefficient is biased toward zero. This can be avoided by the use of
instrumental variables that are uncorrelated with the income measurement
error.Altonji-Siow's regression estimate of the coefficient is 0.08 (see
column 6 of their table 2).If such variables as the change in wage rates,
hours of unemployed, past quits and layoffs are used as instruments, the
estimate jumps to somewhere between 0.3 and 0.4 with a t value of above 4.
Another indication of the importance of income measurement error is the low
explanatory power of Any2 evidenced by a meagre R2 of below 0.5 percent.
Altonji-Siow also conducted the orthogonality test by regressing 1xnc2
on variables dated 1. Contrary to Hal1-Mishkin (1982), they found that no
variables (not even lagged income changes) were significant as a group or
individually. They note that the difference is attributable to their sample23
selection rule of eliminating both high income and low income families due
to the requirement that valid data be available on the variables used as
instruments.This is an example in which treatment of extreme cases in
micro data could influence results in an important way.
Exactly the type of orthogonality test for liquidity constraints
described in the previous section is carried out by Runkle (1983) using the
Denver Income Maintenance Experiment and by Zeldes (1984) using the PSID
data.Both use the log-linear version (210).Zeldes finds that, in
accordance with the hypothesis of liquidity constraints, the coefficient of
lagged income Yi (to use the notation in the previous section) is negative
and significant (with a t value of over 3) for low wealth families but not
for the rest.Because of the cross-section difference in the marginal
income tax rate, the after-tax real rate r in (2.10) differs across
households in the sample. This permits the estimation of the intertemporal
substitution elasticity o. Zeldes's estimate from high wealth families is
about 0.3 and insignificant.Runkle's estimate of o is less precise.
Runkle also finds the coefficient of lagged wealth A1 to be significant
(with a t value of about 3) for nonhomeowners and low wealth families, but
it has a wrong sign (positive). This may be explained by a measurement
error in wealth.Unlike other studies, Runkle's consumption concept is
annual expenditure on nondurables plus services. This measure is computed
by subtracting durables expenditure from total spending which in turn is
computed as the difference between annual disposable income and the change
in wealth.Thus consumption inherits the wealth measurement error with a
minus sign, causing A1 to be negatively correlated with c1 and positively
with Anc2.This correlation will get amplified by the sample selection
rule of including only low wealth families.24
The last three studies cited above do not fully exploit the panel
nature of the data. Instead of estimating T equations as a system where the
t-th equation has LQflCt as the dependent variable, they pooled the equations
into one.Because the error term --whichconsists of the consumption
innovation (forecast error) ej, the change in consumption measurement error
A and the change in taste shock Aflj --islikely to be negatively serially
correlated, the standard errors computed by those studies are likely to be
biased upwards. Another technical problem, which applies to all the models
that have the forecast error term as part of the error term, has been
pointed out by Camberlain (1984).The empirical studies have used the
orthogonality condition that et is uncorrelated with xt-i in the lagged
information set Qt-., which justifies the useofthe regression technique in
the time-series context.Although it guarantees that a time average of
etxt-i converges to 0 as T-x, the rational expectations orthogonality
condition does not necessarily mean that a cross-section average converge to
oasN4w. Namely, it does not guarantee that I'e(w)x_1(w)dw =0(to use
0
the notation introduced at the start of this subsection B). Therefore, all
the significantcoefficients of lagged variables discovered in the
literature using panel data can in principle be explained away by the
(cross-section) correlation between et and xt...i. The practical importance
of this problem, however, is hard to evaluate.13 It is somewhat reassuring
to note that this problem does not arise if the structure of the economy is
such that the forecast error et is the sum of an economy-wide common shock
(which can be separated from ej as a constant across agents) and an
idiosyncratic shock. The economy-wide shock, however, renders the original
intercept term (e.g., u-5ln() in (2.10)) unidentifiable.25
The failure of the orthogonality test can also be explained by the
often neglected distinction between consumption and expenditure which is
important when the commodity is durable.The unanticipated part of an
increase in income calls f or an upward revision in the level of consumption
and hence an increase in expenditure. But if the commodity is durable, the
increased expenditure means a higher level of the stock of consumption to be
carried over to the next period, which will depress expenditure in the next
period. This explains the negative correlation of the change in expenditure
with the lagged income level and change. This also shows that expenditure
on durables cannot be a random walk (Mankiw (1982)).The issue of
durability of a wide range of commodities was investigated by Hayashi
(1985c) who used a Japanese panel data set on expenditure on several
commodities (the 1982 Survey of Family Consumption, conducted by the
Economic Planning Agency). He finds that nondurables and services excluding
food are highly durable, His estimate of A, the fraction of the "rule of
thumb" consumers in the population consisting of wage earners, is about 0.15
with a t value of about 8. He was able to avoid the problem mentioned in
the previous section because in his data set expectations are directly
measured.The low estimate of A is also evidenced in his regression where
food expenditure responds to unanticipated )ncome changes much more strongly
than to anticipated income changes. The R2 of the regression, however, is
less than 0.04.
Besides income measurement errors, there are a couple of explanations
for the low explanatory power of current incomechangesin the equation for
consumption changes reported in the literature.Changes in income, if
either perfectly foreseen or fully insured, do not lead to revisions in
consumption.Butthis is at variance with the result iiiAltonji—Siow(1985)26
and Hayashi (l985c) that the income change coefficient is statistically
significant. The other explanation isthat consumption changes are
dominated by changes in transitory consumption (consumption measurement
errors and taste shocks).The standard deviation of the growth rate
(measured as the change in logs) of consumption is 0.36 in Zeldess (1984)
data where the consumption concept is food expenditure and 0.33 in Runkle's
(1983) data where the consumption concept is nondurables plus services. In
the data set used by Hayashi (1985c) (where data are collected by
interviewers actually visiting households in the survey), the ratio of the
standard deviation of the change in food expenditure to the mean of the
level is about 0.2. Using a Japanese monthly diary data set on hundreds of
expenditure items (the Family Income and Expenditure Survey compiled by the
Prime Minister's Office) where diaries are collected twice a month, Hayashi
(I985b) calculated the standard deviation of the growth rate of quarterly
food expenditure (including expenditure in restaurants) to be about 0.2.
Since the measurement error in this monthly diary survey is likely to be
small, we may conclude that close to a half of the food expenditure growth
in the PSID data set (where at least some data in later waves are collected
over the phone) is attributable to measurement error. As for the division
of the remaining part of food expenditure changes into the forecast error
and the taste shock, Hayashi (1985b) reports that the first order serial
correlation coefficient of monthly food expenditure changes is roughly -0.5
on average.Because there is no durability in food, the change in food
expenditure net of measurement errors is the sum of the forecast error (the
random walk component) and a moving average of a taste shock (see (3,6)).
It seems that the change in food expenditure is dominated by a taste shock
that is close to a white noise. Even with an ideal micro data set we would27
never be able to explain more than, say, 10 percent of changes in food
expenditure by income changes.
Finally, there are two studies based on cross-section data that
specifically address the issue of liquidity constraints. Both use the
1963/64 Survey of Financial Characteristics of Consumers compiled by the
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System. Manger (1983) uses the
implication of deterministic intertemporal optimization that the growth rate
of consumption after adjustment for family size is constant over an interval
between two successive occurrence of binding credit rationing. Given the
age profile of income, this is sufficient to estimate from the level of
current consumption and wealth the length of the horizon for each household
in the sample. He estimates that 7 percent of the sample (which oversampled
wealthy families) has a one-year horizon. His estimation procedure seems to
depend critically on the assumption that the instantaneous utility is
independent of age.Hayashi (1985a) splits the sample into high and low
savingfamilies, andfinds that the correlation structure between
consumption and other variables including income significantly differ
between the two subsets of the sample even after a removal of the possible
bias arising from the sample splitting. He interprets the difference as
evidence for the presence of liquidity constraints on the ground that high
saving families are not likely to be liquidity constrained.
The conclusions we may draw from micro studies are the following.
First, at least a small fraction of the population appears to be liquidity
constrained in that the Euler equation fails in a way predicted by the
hypothesis of liquidity constraints. Second, because most tests on micro
data are the orthogonality tests, we still do not know with confidence the
average horizon of those who satisfy the Euler equation. That information28
is necessary to calculate the response of consumption to a temporary income
change and, more generally, to a change in the stochastic process for
income.Third, the change in consumption is dominated by the transitory
consumption component.Only a small fraction of the change is explainable
by income changes,This suggests the fourth (and somewhat pessimistic)
conc'usion: the observed correlation of the change in consumption with
lagged income is also attributable to a correlation between consumption
measurement error and income measurement error or between consumption taste
shock and leisure taste shock. The latter correlation can occur despite our
basic maintained hypothesis that consumption and leisure are separable in
the utility function.To identify the model we need variables that are
uncorrelated with transitory consumption. Such variables are hard to come
by.29
4. In What Sense is the Loan Market "Imperfect"?
It is not entirely clear what we do with the hard-won evidence that
some consumers are liquidity constrained. Does a consensus estimate of A
(the share of "rule of thumb" consumers in the population) of (say) 0.15
imply that a debt-financed tax cut of $100 for everyone increase per capita
consumption by $15?How is the size of the lagged income coefficient
related to aggregate fluctuations? The problem stems from the vagueness of
the term "liquidity constraints" or "imperfect loan markets" that we noted
in section 2. We will argue by three examples that, unless the exact nature
of the imperfection of the loan market is identified, the economic
implication of the available evidence cannot be determined. In all three
examplestheEuler equation fails and so consumption shows excess
sensitivity.The MPC (marginal propensity to consume) out of a temporary
income increase varies across the examples. Only in the last example the
Ricardian Equivalence Theorem fails to hold.
Consider a consumer in the two-period model whose second period labor
income w2 is a random variable that takes with probability p a low value of
2L and with probability 1-p a high value of 2H. Weassume that U'(0)<
+,sothat the consumer may choose a consumption plan that allows default
with zero consumption. If an actuarially fair insurance is available, the
risk averse consumer will engage in an insurance scheme that eliminates the
income risk entirely. So the intertemporal optimization problem is exactly
as in Figure 1(a) with the 2e in the figure replaced by 2L +(lp)w21.
The relevant marginal loan rate is the risk-free rate r.If we had data on
the consumption and income changes for consumers whose utility function may
differ in a way unrelated to the difference across consumers in the
dtributionof w2,thereshouldhe no'3iqilii cantcorrelationbetweentheIn the following three examples1 we
discussed later, such income risk sharing is
In the first example, lenders have the same
of w2.Let Z and R be the loan principal
Since w2 is at least with probability one,
rate available to the consumer) must equal the
competition among lenders when Z w2L/(1+r).
the consumer will default with probability
w2L/U+r. The loan rate r* on such a marginal
(4.1) 1 +r*=(1+r)/(1—p),
assume that, for reasons to be
not available to the consumer.
opinion about the distribution
and the contracted repayment.
the loan rate (the borrowing
market rate r under perfect
However, when Z > w2L/(l+r),
p on a marginal loan above
loan satisfies
if lenders are risk neutral or if there are many consumers of the same
characteristic.Thus the marginal loan rate schedule jumps up from r to r*
at z =w2L/U+r).If the consumer defaults, the second period consumption
is zero. So the expected lifetime utility under a loan contract (Z,R) is:
(4,2) u(w1÷Z) ÷ pu[max(O,w2L_R)] +(1p)u[max(O,w2H_R)].
Since the focus of the paper is on liquidity constraints, we suppose
that the value of (w11w21,w)') is such that the consumer facing this
marginal loan rate schedule plans to default. in the low-income state. Thus
QU
twovariables.This is a test proposed by Scheinkman (1984) of the Arrow-
Debreu complete markets paradigm. Note that this restriction is stronger
than the Euler equation which by itself places no restrictions onthe
contemporaneous correlation of actual consumption changes with actual income
changes.31
the consumer behaves as if the middle term in (4.2) is absent. It is easy
to show that the Euler equation is:
(4.3) U'(C1) = (1+r*)(1—p)u' (c2H ),
where c1 =w1+Zand = R.This is a violation of the Euler
equation without liquidity constraints because the latter requires:
(4.4) u'(c1) =(1+r)[pu'(O)+(lp)u'(Cl1)].
Italso is different from the Euler equation that would result if (as we
will assume for the third example below) the gap between the loan rate and
the risk-free rates were exogenously given and unrelated to defaults:
(4.5) u' (c1) =(1+r')[pu' (c21 ) +(1—p)u'(c )],
where1+r' =dA2/d(A1+w1-c1)and c21 is the second period consumption in the
low-income state.Despite the existence in this first example of the loan
rate schedule as an increasing function of the loan quantity, the preference
parameters cannot be estimated by (4.5).
Because the Euler equation without liquidity constraints (4.4) fails,
consumption shows excess sensitivity.14 However, the Ricardian Equivalence
Theorem still holds. To see this, suppose the government cuts taxes in real
terms by x in exchange for a second period tax increase of (l+r)x. This
increases w1 by x but reduces both 2L 2H by (1+r)x. Thus the marginaI
loan rate schedule shifts to the left by exactly x. But the demand for
private loans is also reduced by x because of the newly acquired government32
loan.The net result of a debt-financed tax cut, therefore, is that the
government loan thus provided crowds out the private loan market on a
dollar-for-dollar basis and leaves the optimal consumption plan unaltered.
It is not at all clear why income insurance markets are not present in
this example where both borrowers and lenders have common knowledge about
the distribution of future income. The equilibrium loan contract (Z,R) is
period income w1, there are two types (type L and type H) of consumers.
Labor income in period 1 and 2 is (w1,w2H for type L and (w1,w2H) for type
H consumers. That is, p is unity for type L and zero for type H consumers.
The type is private information: no one knows the type of other consumers
but oneself.This eliminates private income insurance markets. But the
loan market will still exist. In Figure 2 the horizontal and vertical axes
represent consumption and income in the two periods. The origin for type L
consumers is the point on the vertical axis, reflecting the difference in
the second period income between the two types. The same point E represents
the initial endowments both for type L with (w1,w2L) and for type H with
(w1,w2H). The slope of the line ED is 1+r, because if the loan principal is
less than FD ( w)/(l+r)) no defaults will occur. Let m be the share of
type L consumers in the population consisting of consumers with the same
really a combination of two things: (i) an actuarially fair insurance whose
payoffinclusive of the premium is (l÷r)Z_w2L when w2 =Land
_(p/(1p))[(1+r)Z_w2L] when w2 =2Hand (ii) a risk-free loan of principal
Z. The insurance implicit in the loan is constrained so that c2 =0when w2
So the loan market cannot be a perfect substitute for insurance
markets, although one would not call this loan market "imperfect".
The next example we consider is similar to the model considered by
Jaffee-Russel (1976).For each class of consumers indexed by the first33
first period income w1.If the loan principal is greater than FD and if
both types apply for the loan, only a fraction (1-u) of a marginal loan
above w2L/(1+r) will be repaid, so that the marginal loan rate is r* which
satisfies the condition analogous to (4.1): 1+r* =(l+r)/(1—u).Thus, the
line DC with a slope of l+r* along with the line ED with a slope of 1+r
represents the set of (c1,c2) available to type H consumers when both types
apply for the same loan.
As we know from Rothchild-Stiglitz (1976) and Wilson (1977), there are
two types of equilibrium in this informationally jjfçt loan market. In
a separating equilibrium, type L consumers choose the point A while the
consumption plan for type H is the point B. Since type L consumers are
indifferent between A and B (which translates into the point G as type L
consumers will not repay the loan in full), they have no incentive to switch
from A to B by claiming that they are of type H. Type H consumers are
credit rationed in the sense that they would like to borrow more at the
stated loan rate of r. No defaults occur. In a pooling equilibrium, both
types choose the loan contract represented by the point C where an
indifference curve for type H is tangent to the line DC. If type H prefers
B to C, then a pair of loan contracts (A,B) is the separating equilibrium
(Wilson's (1977) El equilibrium). Otherwise the point C is the equilibrium
ir loan contract (Wilson's E2 equilibrium). Since type L consumers prefer C
to A, they also apply for the loan contract represented by the point C
knowing that they will default. Clearly, the Euler equation fails to hold
for both types in the pooling equilibrium and for type H in the separating
equilibrium. In particular, for type H the MPC outofa temporary increase
ft currentincome isabout unity in the separating equilibrium. We can
thin] of type H consumers as ones experiencing a temporary drop in income.34
Becausethey are mixed up with low income people in the loan market, their
consumption is forced to be temporarily low. Thus their consumption appears
to be tracking income.
It is now easy to see that, whichever equilibrium obtains, a debt-
financed tax cut of quantity x in exchange for a tax increase in the second
period of (1+r)x will have no real effects. The tax cut will move the
initial endowment from E to E'. Now lenders realize that the fractionof
a marginal loan above w2L/U+r)_x will be defaulted if both types apply for
the loan. In the separating equilibrium, the amount of credit available is
cut back by exactly x.In the pooling equilibrium, the loan principal at
which the loan rate jumps up from r to r* is also reduced by x. The
equilibrium consumption plan is left unaltered. This irrelevance result
remains valid even if type L consumers fail to pay the second period tax in
full in the event of default, as long as the unpaid tax is borne by type ft
consumers of the same first period income. Although income redistribution
between the two types occurs, the following argument for irrelevance does
not assume homothetic preferences. Suppose the size of a debt-financed tax
cut is Fl in Figure 2. The second period tax to be paid by type L exceeds
2L If the unpaid tax bill when type L defaults is to be picked up by type
H consumers, the second period tax on type H is precisely EF plus IJ where
the point J is the vertical projection of I on DB.16 Thus the feasible set
of (c1,c2) for type H when both types apply for the same loan is unchanged.
If the initial equilibrium is the separating equilibrium (A,B), then clearly
this equilibrium is undisturbed by the tax cut.
In the preceding two examples, the excess sensitivity of consumption is
not exploitable for stabilization purposes through substitution of taxes for
the public debt.Qe now turn to the last example where the excess35
sensitivity is exploitable. Here the basic premise is that the government
is more efficient than the private loan market in arranging loans. This may
arise if transactions costs for collecting private loans are higher than for
collecting taxes, or if the court does not honor at least some private loan
contracts.As shown by Barro (1984), a debt-financed tax cut will increase
aggregate consumption because the governmenlys increased share of lending
activity raises the overall efficiency.In the extreme case where the
private loan market is nonexistent because the legal system does not honor
any private loan contracts, the MPC out of an increase in income induced by
a debt-financed tax cut is exactly one, not zero. A model in which the
Ricardian Equivalence Theorem does not hold but in which the gap between the
loan rate and the risk-free rate is based on imperfect information, is also
constructed by King (1984). Unlike our second example above, King assumes
that lenders cannot observe the total loan quantity which a consumer borrows
from various lenders.36
5. Concluding Remarks
By way of concluding, let us see what answers have been provided by
recent empirical work to the three questions raised at the beginning of this
paper.The answer to the first question is positive. Some consumers are
liquidity constrained in the sense of credit rationing or differential
interest rates. But the same conclusion can be obtained from the following
simple observation: according to the Federal Reserve Bulletin, the average
rate on 24-month personal loans in 1982 was 18.65 percent, while the yield
on 2-year U.S. Treasury notes in 1982 was 12.80 percent. This is a piece of
evidence for liquidity constraints with a standard error of zero.
The estimation of the preference parameters under liquidity constraints
is probably meaningless if done on aggregate data, because it would be
impossible for economies with imperfect loan markets to induce the utility
function of the representative consumer from heterogeneous consumers. If
micro data are used, consumers who are likely to be liquidity constrained
should be excluded from the sample because their first-order optimality
condition depends on the specification of the loan market. The estimation
of the preference parameters using a short panel is possible only when we
can get cross-section variations in prices (e.g., after-tax interest rates).
The available evidence gives only a partial answer to the third
question.The finding that the Euler equation fails for a fraction of the
population does imply that consumption is excessively sensitive to temporary
income changes.But that does not allow us to calculate quantitatively
(even abstracting from the general equilibrium interaction running from
consumption to income) the response of consumption to a hypothetical
temporary increase in labor income. This is partly because the horizon of
those who satisfy the Euler equation is unknown and partly because the37
concomitant changes in the loan rate schedule depend on the specification of
the loan market.As for the Ricardjan Equivalence Theorem, the available
evidence has no implication.33
Footnotes
1. Dornbusch-Fischer (1984, pp.186-87) cite liquidity constraints as the
candidate to explain the excess sensitivity of consumption to income.
DeLong-Summers (1984) credits the increased availability of consumer loans
with the reduced variability of aggregate demand in the postwar U.S.
Scheinkman-Weiss (1984) shows in an equilibrium model of business cycles
inhabited by optimizing agents that borrowing constraints fundamentally
alter the time-series properties of the model. In Walsh's (1984) general
equilibrium model, anticipated money has real effects as it changes the
probability of people being short of cash and lines of credit.
2. The statements in this paragraph about the MPC's remain valid if risky
assets are introduced.
3. See Hayashi (1985a) for other reasons against the consumption function
approach.
4. The derivation of (2.9) and (2.10) uses the approximation that n(1+x)
x.
5. If the realization of r is not known in period 1, the consumption
innovation is correlated with r.Thus r must be instrumented by some
variable (e.g., lagged value of r) in the period 1 information set.
6. See Muellbauer (1983), Manger (1983) and Zeldes (1984). Rotemberg
(1984) shows that expected future liquidity constraints can explain why
people hold financial assets and liabilities simultaneously.
7. If the utility function is quadratic and if (1+r) =1,the consumption
innovation is simply the change in consumption. Kotlikoff-Pakes (1984)
show how to calculate the consumption innovation for general nonlinear
utility functions.
8. However, Miron (1984) reports that when the seasonal fluctuations in
consumptionareexplicitlyincluded in the utility function the
overidentifying restrictions cannot be rejected.
9. One exception is Summers (1982) who puts c-Aw (consumption minus a
fraction of labor income) in place of c in the Euler equation and
estimates A.Aw is the part of aggregate consumption by liquidity
constrained agents.His estimate of A is too imprecise to draw any
conclusions. See text below for the definition of A.
10. DeLong-Summers (1984) and Mankiw-Shapiro (1984) show that disposable
income in postwar U.S. is a random walk.
11. See, however, Eichenbauin-Hansen (1984) who show that a restriction on
individual heterogeneity makes the representative agent's utility function
free from income distribution.They also incorporate durability of
commodities into the model.
12. The termcan also be interpreted as a preferencehock. See (3.6).:39
13. Hayashi (1985c) gives a somewhat contrived example in which an
unanticipated income tax reform causes a cross-section correlation between
e2 and y..
14. A simple calculation under the assumption that (1+r) =Ishows that the
MPCoutof a temporary income increase is (1+r* )/(2+r*). Under a complete
income risk pooling the MPC is (1+r)/(2+r).
15. This E2 equilibrium seems to correspond to the situation referred to by
Jaffee-Russel (1976) as credit rationing.
16. If type L consumers default, the additional tax to be levied on a type H
consumer is DIx(1+r)p/(1-p). This equalsKJ111 Figure 2 because IJ equals
DIx(1+r*) =DIx(1+r)/(l—p)and 11<equalsDIx(1+r).40
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